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Abstract 
This paper examines the influence of wage dispersion on job mobility. An 
on-the-job search model is used to describe the strategy of working 
individuals. We derive and estimate elasticities with respect to moments of 
the wage offer distribution. For this we do not need to assume a specific 
parametric form of this distribution, nor do we have to estimate the whole 
distribution. We also examine what happens to mobility if, in addition to a 
change of the wage offer distribution, the present wage changes by an amount 
proportional to the difference of the wage and the mean of the wage offer 
distribution. The results suggest that the effects depend on whether the 
present wage is smaller or larger than the mean wage offer. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the main issues in the debate on labour market policy concerns the 
influence of wage dispersion on job mobility. It is often argued that the 
existence of wage dispersion forms an incentive for employed individuals to 
search for jobs with higher wages. An increase of the spread of net wages may 
then stimulate job mobility, since for moving to another job to be attractive, 
the wage rise involved should at least offset the transaction costs associated 
with such a move. Such an increase of dispersion could be imposed by means of 
a weakening of the progressive structure of the tax system. A high degree of 
job mobility may be associated with a high efficiency of the allocative 
performance of the labour market, and, therefore, may be regarded as 
desirable. Up to now, empirical research on these issues is scarce. This may 
be because such research requires examining how a wage (offer) distribution in 
a certain segment of the labour market influences the strategy of an 
individual in that segment. Thus, it seems that reliable estimates of these 
distributions are necessary, in addition to a model describing the strategy of 
individuals. 
This paper does not provide new results on all of these issues. Rather, it 
focuses on one aspect involved. In particular, we estimate the elasticity of 
the transition rate from one job to other jobs with respect to the spread of 
the wage offer distribution. The transition rate from one job to other jobs is 
supposed to be an indicator of job mobility. The model describing the strategy 
of working individuals is an on-the-job search model that pays particular 
attention to the costs associated with moving from one job to another job. 
These transaction costs are likely to be among the important factors 
determining job mobility. 
To estimate elasticities with respect to parameters (moments) of the wage 
offer distribution, we need information on that distribution. In this paper we 
develop a method to estimate such elasticities that does not require estimates 
of the whole wage offer distribution. Indeed, only the mean of the wage offer 
distribution is needed. By combining the estimates of the mean with estimates 
of the transition rate to other jobs and the costs of moving to another job, 
we are able to estimate elasticities of the transition rate to other jobs, and 
the reservation wage, with respect to the mean and variance of the wage offer 
distribution. Our estimation method bears some resemblance to the method 
developed by Lancaster & Chesher (1983) to estimate elasticities for 
unemployed individuals in a job search framework, using subjective responses 
on their strategy. 
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In Section 2 we present the on-the-job search model and discuss the 
estimation of the transaction costs and the transition rate to other jobs. In 
addition to duration data, we use rather unique data on self-reported 
reservation wages of employed individuals. In Section 3 we derive expressions 
for the elasticities and present the procedure to estimate them. Section 4 
contains the results. First we consider what happens to mobility if the wages 
of new jobs become more dispersed, which corresponds to an increase in 
dispersion of the wage offer distribution with present wages held constant. 
Then we consider what happens if all wages become more dispersed. In the 
latter case the present wage also shifts in a way corresponding to its place 
in the distribution of wage offers. Section 4 also examines whether the 
results are robust with respect to possible misspecifications. In particular 
it is examined whether the results are biased because of a bias in the 
estimates of the mean of the wage offer distribution due to a neglect of human 
capital accumulation. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model and the data 
2.1. Model specification 
This section presents an on-the-job search model and a semi-structural 
estimation method for the costs of moving to other jobs and the transition 
rate to other jobs. Because the model, the data, and the estimation method 
have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Van den Berg (1992)), the present 
exposition will be brief. In Section 3 we examine the elasticities of interest 
and we examine which additional data are needed to be able to estimate them. 
The theory of on-the-job search tries to explain the behaviour of employed 
individuals who search for a better job (for a survey, see Mortensen (1986)). 
In the basic version of the theory, search and job turnover are costless so in 
principle everybody is engaged in search. Suppose an individual works at a 
wage w. Offers of new jobs arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival 
rate A. Such job offers are random drawings (without recall) from a wage offer 
distribution F(x). For the moment we assume that a job is characterized by its 
wage level and that jobs can be held forever. Every time a job offer arrivés 
the decision has to be made whether to accept it or to reject it. Individuals 
aim at maximization of their expected discounted lifetime income (over an 
infinite horizon). They are assumed to know A and F(x). The subjective rate of 
discount is denoted by p. 
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Most papers on on-the-job search assume that the model is stationary (see 
e.g. Hey & McKenna (1979), Holmlund (1984), Mortensen (1985), Albrecht, 
Holmlund & Lang (1986), Burgess (1988)). This means that w, A and F(x) are 
assumed to be independent of the duration of being in the present job and 
independent of all events during the stay in the present job. Further, A and 
F(x) are not allo wed to depend on w. The motivation for adopting stationarity 
is that in a nonstationary setting the model equations become intractable. 
Also, most empirical studies using structural job search models for the 
unemployed assume stationarity of the models for computational reasons. In Van 
den Berg (1992) the stationarity assumption is tested using the same data as 
used in this paper. It appears that the stationary model gives a good 
representation of the data. 
The model does not allow for transitions into unemployment. From a 
conceptual point of view such an extension can be made easily. However, our 
main interest is in job-to-job transitions. Inclusion of transitions into 
unemployment would make the model equations more complicated and would require 
more data than presently used to estimate the model. 
We incorporate the transaction costs associated with moving from one job 
to another, by assuming that every time one moves from one job to another, an 
amount of money c has to be paid. Also, since there are various reasons to 
assume that c depends on the present wage, we allow c to be a function of w. 
For example, the amount of pension claims that may be lost when moving to 
another job may be related to the present wage. Also, individuals who earn a 
high wage may have spent more money on their house and their children's 
education. If the costs associated with changing houses and education are 
cofrelated with the value of the old house and the money already spent on 
education, then c will be larger for individuals who earn a high wage. 
To maintain stationarity, we assume that c as a function of w does not 
depend on the time spent in the present job nor on events during the stay in 
the present job. In combination with the infinite horizon assumption, 
stationarity of the model implies that the employed individual's perception of 
the future is independent of the time spent in the present job. Consequently, 
the optimal strategy is constant during the present job. 
Analogous to Hey & McKenna (1979) we do not incorporate per-period search 
costs in the model. This is because in our opinion actual search (noticing 
advertisements when reading newspapers, contacting potential employers, making 
expenses-paid visits to them etc.) is relatively costless for the individuals 
in the data set. Also, allowing for nonzero search costs would generate 
computational problems when estimating the model, because the presence of such 
3 
costs implies that it is optimal for some individuals not to search on the job 
(see e.g. Burdett (1978)). As shown in Van den Berg (1992), the data suggest 
that in some sense all employed individuals are engaged in search. 
Allowing c to be a non-constant function of w has important consequences 
for the properties of the optimal strategy of an employed individual. Indeed, 
the set of acceptable wage offers may not be connected. In that case the 
optimal strategy does not have the reservation wage property, that is, there 
is no quantity such that a job offer is acceptable if and only if its wage 
exceeds that quantity. This is basically because the value of a (new) job 
depends not only on its wage x, but also on the costs c(x) that have to be 
paid when leaving that job. It can be shown however that if c'(w) < l/A for 
every w, then the optimal strategy can be characterized in terms of 
reservation wages (see Van den Berg (1989)). Whether this is a strong 
condition cannot be said a priori, but the estimation results in Van den Berg 
(1992) seem to be consistent with it. In the sequel we assume that the 
condition is satisfied. 
Consequently, the optimal strategy for an individual earning a wage w can 
be written as follows: accept a wage offer x if x>£(w) and reject it if 
x<£(w). We call £(w) the reservation wage, which of course depends on all the 
explanatory variables in the model. It can be shown that £(w) has the 
following properties. 
(i) £(w) > w •«* c(w) % 0 
(ii) C(w) > 0 * c'(w) > - i 
(iii) if c'(w)=0, then: £'(W)<! **• c(w)>0 
The results in (i) and (ii) make sense. If job changing costs are positive 
then one is more reluctant to move to another job than when such costs are 
absent. If c as a function of the wage level decreases very fast at w then the 
job offers that are not acceptable at w become acceptable for wages larger 
than w. 
The case c'(w)=0 for every w, c>0 has been analyzed extensively by Hey & 
McKenna (1979). In that case £(w)>w+p.c, and the gap between £(w) and w is a 
decreasing function of w. This can be understood by the following argument. 
Individuals take into account that they may change jobs more than once in the 
future. Therefore, the reservation wage has to exceed the sum of the present 
wage and the long-run compensation of the transaction costs that have to be 
paid for the first move. The more job changes one expects, the larger the gap 
between £(w) and w because one does not want to pay transaction costs too 
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frequently in order to reach a high wage level. Because the number of job 
changes one expects is relatively large for individuals who have a relatively 
low wage, this implies that the gap (between £(w) and w) is decreasing in w. 
To be able to use the model for structural empirical analysis, the 
reservation wage has to be solved in terms of w, c(w), A, F(x) and p. The 
evolution of f as a function of w follows a complicated differential equation 
which does not have an explicit solution. Also, numerical methods would 
generate severe computational problems (see Van den Berg (1992)). The 
following equation provides local approximations of £(w). 
(D «w) = w + ! _ P ( ^ ( W ) -c(w) + o(c(w)) 
in which 
(2) 0(w) = AF(f(w)) with F = 1-F 
Of course, ö(w) is the transition rate from the present job with wage w to 
other jobs, or, equivalently, the exit rate out of the present job. Equation 
(1) is a Taylor series expansion of f(w) around c(w)=0, keeping w constant in 
the expansion. It can be shown that the approximate £(w) that is obtained by 
deleting the o(c(w)) term in equation (1), preserves many of the properties of 
the exact f(w), and is accurate in many instances (for details, see Van den 
Berg (1992)). Note that equation (1) is an implicit equation in f(w), since 
ö(w) depends on the latter variable. 
The equation for the approximate £(w) has intuitive appeal. Suppose 
c'(w)=0. In that case £(w) is approximated by w+(p+ö(w)).c(w). As explained 
before, if c(w) is constant and positive then f(w) exceeds w+pc(w) because one 
takes into account that one may have to pay transaction costs more than once 
in the future. Further, the more job changes one expects and the higher the 
transaction costs, the larger the gap between f and w+pc(w). The term 
0(w).c(w) in the approximation takes account of this. Now suppose c'(w) and 
c(w) are positive. Then, in the approximation, £(w) exceeds the £(w) that 
would have prevailed if c'(w) were zero. This effect is more pronounced if 
ö(w) is large. Again this is plausible: if transaction costs increase with 
wages and if one is still at the bottom of the wage distribution then £(w) 
must be large to prevent paying too many transaction costs in order to reach a 
high wage level in the future. 
From (2), 0(w) depends on all "structural" parameters A, F(x), c(w), w and 
p. However, because of the stationarity assumption, ö(w) does not depend on 
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the elapsed duration in the present job. Consequently, the job duration has an 
exponential distribution with parameter 0(w). 
2.2. The data 
The data set used is constructed from the Labour Market Research Panel, a 
survey conducted by the Netherlands Organization for Strategie Labour Market 
Research (OSA). As of April 1985 a sample of about 4000 individuals living in 
The Netherlands is interviewed every one and a half year. The sample includes 
only individuals aged between 15 and 61. For our study only the first wave of 
the panel is available. Respondents are asked to recall their labour market 
history from January, 1980 until the date of the interview. Further, they were 
asked to provide information on their income on the date of the interview. The 
data set contains a wide range of job characteristics and information on the 
social and working environment of individuals who are employed in April, 1985. 
Another distinguishing feature of the data set is that individuals who were 
employed at the date of the interview were asked for their lowest acceptable 
net wage offer. Responses on this question are interpreted as the observed 
counterpart of the reservation wage £(w). 
For our estimation purposes we selected individuals who were employed in a 
paid job at the date of the interview. As a result of the selection we 
obtained a sub-sample containing 1757 individuals. 
2.3. Estimation of the model 
In this subsection we briefly discuss the estimation of particular parameters 
of the model. Specifically, the information on job durations and observed 
reservation wages is used to estimate ö(w) and c(w). 
By assuming that the individual inflow rate into the present job is 
constant before the moment of the interview, the elapsed job duration t has an 
exponential distribution with parameter ö(w) (see e.g. Ridder (1984)). The 
inflow rate may depend on the wage of the present job and other observables 
without affecting this result. The observed reservation wages are denoted by 
f. These may differ from the true reservation wages 
(3) i = £ + e 
e is an error term which is interpreted as a measurement error that is i.i.d. 
across individuals and independent of duration t and present wage w. 
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Consequently, individuals use £ instead of f as their strategy, so 6 depends 
on £ instead of £, and equation (2) does not depend on e. In addition, t and £ 
are independent. The true reservation wage £ is the solution of equation (1), 
deleting the o(c(w)) term in that equation. 
(4) £(w) = w + , f | g W > x(w) v
 '
 s v
 ' 1-c' (w)0(w) v ' 
Not all structural parameters are identified from the data on t and £. In 
particular A and F are not identified because both (2) and (4) only depend on 
the product AF(.). The general approach to obtain identification of A and F in 
structural job search models is to assume that F satisfies Flinn h Heekman 
(1982)'s recoverability condition and use data on post-spell wages. Because 
our data set is essentially a cross-section, it does not provide information 
on wages that are earned after moving to another job, so this approach cannot 
be used here. Moreover, even if we would have drawings of the truncated wage 
offer distribution with known points of truncation, the use of such data to 
estimate the parameters of an a priori chosen parametric class of 
distributions for F would be hazardous, since the estimates may be sensitive 
with respect to the chosen class (Flinn & Heekman (1982)). 
However, we can do a reduced-form estimation of 6 from the duration data 
and use these estimates in the reservation wage equation (4) in order to 
estimate c(w) from (3). To estimate c(w), A and F need not be estimable 
separately. The estimation method proposed here is flexible in the sense that 
the structural parameters in c(w) are estimated without the need to make 
strong assumptions on A and F. Moreover, by using a reduced-form specification 
for 0(w) we are able to check whether certain predictions of the theory hold. 
For instance, the theory predicts that 0'(w)<O •&• £'(w)>0. 
In Van den Berg (1992) the results obtained by using the estimation method 
proposed above are presented. These results will be used in Subsection 3.3 for 
the estimation of the elasticities of 9 and £ with respect to the moments of 
F. On the relevant wage interval, the cost of moving to another job c(w) is 
written as a linear function of explanatory variables x1 and the present wage. 
(5) c(w) = Xi'n + oc.w 
(Note that here x refers to explanatory variables whereas in Subsection 2.1 x 
referred to wage offers.) The vector xx includes characteristics of the 
neighbourhood in which one lives, personal characteristics and characteristics 
of the present job. The latter characteristics consist of occupation dummies 
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and pecuniary and non-pecuniary fringes. 
The exit rate out of the present job ö(w) is written as an exponential 
function of explanatory variables x2 and the logarithm of the present wage 
(6) 0(w) = exp(x2 'r2 - /S.log w) 
We assume that (6) gives a good approximation of (2) for the range of x2 and w 
in the data. Recall that 6 depends on all c(w), by way of £. Consequently, x2 
has to include all explanatory variables in xv Most of these explanatory 
variables also influence A and F. For instance the age of an individual or 
whether he is married may influence c(w) but may also give an indication of 
the productivity of the job searcher, and therefore influence A. 
The parameters /? and y2 are estimated by ML using the duration data. We 
plug these estimates into equation (4) and substitute (5) into (4). The 
resulting equation is used to estimate ex and 7^ by nonlinear least squares 
(see equation (3)). Note that by using this procedure we do not have to choose 
a parametric class of distributions for the error term e. 
The subjective rate of discount p is fixed at 15% a year. From an 
extensive examination in Van den Berg (1992) of the model quality, it appears 
that the estimation results satisfy non-imposed properties of the theoretical 
model. Further, the results are robust with respect to changes in some of the 
assumptions made (like the assumption that p=15%), whereas other assumptions 
(like the no-heterogeneity assumption) are not rejected by the data. 
We will summarize some results that are relevant for the sequel. For most 
individuals in the sample, the estimate of c(w) (resulting from the estimates 
of c* and yx) is positive. The estimate of c* is significantly positive. Still, 
for all individuals in the sample, this estimate is smaller than one over the 
estimate of 0(w). So, the estimate of l-oi.0(w), which is the denominator of 
the ratio in (4), is always positive. As a result, £(w) is generally larger 
than w. Now note from equation (4) that f(w) can be thought of as being the 
sum of a part due to w and a part due to c(w). It appears that on average 
w / f ( w ) equals about 0.88, so the presence of transaction costs accounts on 
average for about 12% of the magnitude of £(w). 
Concerning the influence of w on £(w) and 0(w) we have that the estimate 
of /? equals 0.41 and is significantly different from zero (so ö'(w)<u) a n d 
that the estimate of £'(w) is positive for all individuals in the sample. The 
sample average of the estimate of £'(w) equals 1.11 and the Standard deviation 
over the sample of the estimate of £'(w) is small (0.05). 
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3. Elasticities with respect to moments of the wage offer distribution 
3.1. Assumptions and derivation 
As is clear from the previous section, we do not want to impose strong 
assumptions on the functional form of F. Our main interest is in the 
elasticities of 0 and £ with respect to the first two moments of F. We only 
make assumptions on the way these moments enter as parameters in the density 
function f of F. Specifically, we assume that the wage offer distribution has 
location-scale parameters j^eR and <r>0 in the sense of Ferguson (1967): the 
wage offer density f(x) at xeR given the parameters fi and o can be written as 
(7) f(x) = i . f 0 ( ^ ) 
for some density f0 which does not depend on /x and o. In addition, we assume 
that the distribution corresponding to the density f0 has mean and variance 
equal to zero and one, respectively. It follows that \i and o are the mean and 
Standard deviation of the wage offer distribution. Of cour se, we assume that 
/i>0. It should be stressed that we do not assume here that the wage offer 
distribution F belongs to some fully parameterized family of distributions. 
Rather, we make a minimal assumption necessary to be able to calculate 
elasticities w.r.t. the mean and Standard deviation of F. 
In the sequel we suppress the dependence of f and F on fx and a. The 
distribution corresponding to f0 is denoted by F0. From (7), 
(8) F(x) = F 0 ( X ^) 
The objective is to estimate the elasticities of 9 and f with respect to p, 
and er. By substituting equation (8) into equation (2) we obtain 
(9) e = AF 0 (^M) 
Denote ^ ^ by £*. Differentiation of (9) with respect to o results in 
uo» % = -A.fo(f-) . i . [% - e ] - - « < o . [ g - n 
The partial derivative of f with respect to o is obtained by using equation 
(4). Note that £ depends on o (and on fi) only through 6. Bef ore 
differentiation we may substitute equation (5) in equation (4), since the 
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former equation gives a parameterization of an explanatory 'variable' in the 
model. (Note that equation (6) cannot be used when deriving expressions for 
elasticities since it gives a reduced-form description of a dependent 
'variable'.) We obtain 
(11) %- = 1 + ° * x * 
Let ^J(X) be the failure rate of the wage offer distribution at x, so tp(x) = 
f(x)/F(x). From (10) and (11) it follows that 
d log 9
 = rHZ).(t-li) 
(l-oc9)2 
The elasticity of £ with respect to c can be deduced from (11) and (12). The 
elasticities of 9 and £ with respect to fx can be derived analogously. As a 
result, 
1+ocp 
d log £ (l-oc9) 
€-/* 
d log a 1 + 9Mt). 1+aP
 2-c ( 1 - a ö ) 2 
• i 
d log 9 
d log /i ~ i-V 
d log 9 
'd log o 
d log £ V 3 1og£ 
d log fj. £-fjL 'd log er 
Note that elasticities with respect to o are obtained by multiplying the 
elasticities with respect to o with 0.5. 
An increase of o increases the dispersion of wage offers. One might say 
that in such a case the level of inequality of wage offers increases. The 
well-known Gini-coefficient is a measure of the level of inequality or 
concentration of a random variable. The following result provides a link 
between a change of the Standard deviation o of a distribution satisfying the 
assumptions we made, and the resulting change of the Gini-coefficient of this 
distribution. 
For a wage offer distribution satisfying the assumptions made in this 
subsection, the elasticity of the Gini-coefficient with respect to the 
Standard deviation is equal to one. 
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The proof is in the appendix. This result may help in understanding what it 
means when the Standard deviation of the wage offer distribution increases by, 
say, 10%. (It might be interesting to note that, after the Second World War, 
in most industrialized countries, the Gini coëfficiënt of post-(personal-)tax 
income is about 6% to 12% smaller than the Gini coëfficiënt of pre-tax income 
(see e.g. Kakwani (1980), Hartog (1981), Silber (1989)). Kakwani (1980) 
examines the relation between tax parameters and these Gini coefficients in 
specific models.) 
Let us examine the signs of the elasticities derived above. Assume that a 
and c are positive. One can distinguish two effects on the transition rate to 
other jobs 9 if the mean \i of F increases. First, there is a direct positive 
effect because of the shift to the right of F: more job offers become 
acceptable, holding £ constant. Secondly, there is an indirect effect on 9 
because of the change of f. The change of £ has the same sign as the change of 
9. If, for example, 9 increases, then the expected number of transitions in 
the future increases. In order to prevent that one has to pay transaction 
costs too often in order to reach a high wage level, the reservation wage £ 
then also increases. As a result, the direct and the indirect effect on 6 are 
opposite. It follows that both £ and 9 increase in response to an increase of 
/x. This means that the first effect on 9 dominates the second. 
Now consider an increase of the Standard deviation o of F. Again there are 
two effects on 9. The sign of the direct effect (the effect of the larger 
spread of F, holding £ constant) depends on whether f > /z. If £>// (£</i) then 
probability mass is transferred from the region below (above) £ to the region 
above (below) £, so F(£) increases (decreases) and the effect is positive 
(negative). The indirect effect on 9 works through £. Again the change of £ 
has the same sign as the change of 9, for the same reason as in the previous 
paragraph. It follows that £ and 9 increase (decrease) in response to an 
increase of o if £>[j, (£</u). Consequently, the direct effect on 9 always 
dominates the indirect effect. 
Recall that on average the present wage equals about 88% of the 
reservation wage. Therefore, generally, individuals with £</i are individuals 
who have low wages relative to other individuals in the same segment of the 
labour market. Because d9/da<0 if £<n, it then follows that for individuals 
with relatively low wages, mobility is reduced when the spread of the wage 
offer distribution is increased. 
One might argue that it is hazardous to use an expansion of £ in terms of 
c to examine how f depends on \i and o. For a general function y(x,z) it is not 
always true that the derivative w.r.t. z of an expansion of y in terms of x 
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results in a good approximation of dy/dz. In Pittnauer (1972) general 
sufficiënt conditions are presented ensuring that such an approximation is 
good (for example, one of these conditions states that y(x,z) should be 
analytical). It would be beyond the scope of this paper to check whether £, as 
a function of c, fi and er, satisfies these conditions. However, it seems that £ 
is sufficiently well-behaved for the conditions to hold. 
3.2. Shifting wages 
It can be argued that in some cases a policy that changes the wage offer 
distribution also affects the present wage. For instance, if such changes are 
effectuated by means of a change of the tax system, then present wages are 
also likely to change. Therefore, in this subsection, we derive elasticities 
with respect to the mean and Standard deviation of F that take account of 
this. Let the following equation describe the way w varies with fi and a. 
w = fi + cr.k with k independent of fi and o 
This means that the influence of fi and o on present wages is similar to their 
influence on wage offers in that fi and er act as location and scale parameters. 
In other words, if fi or o changes, then w shifts in a way corresponding to its 
place in the wage offer distribution, so F(w) does not change. 
First, consider a change of fi. When fi changes to /z+d/x, then w changes to 
w+d^u (so dw/dfi=l). The derivatives of 0 and £ with respect to fi that take 
account of this, are denoted by 
_?ö „„,, Jê_ 
respectively. Of course there holds that dO/dfi,w = dOjdfi + 89/dv and d£/3/i,w = 
di/dp, + df/3w, so 
d log 6 fj. d log 9 
d log fi w 'd log w 
d log £ , ü d l o § £ 
d log fi w 'd log w 
The elasticities with respect to w, on the right-hand side of (13) and (14), 
can be derived analogously to the elasticities derived in the previous 
subsection. Alternatively, they can be derived using equations (4) and (6), 
that is, using the empirical model specification, since the reduced-form 
(13) d log e = 
d log ^,w ~ 
(14) JV°g * = 
v
 ' d log /x,w 
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specification (6) of 9 explicitly describes how 9 depends on w. 
Now consider a change of o. Because dw/da = k = (w-fi)/a, it follows that 
if w>fj, (w<fj,), then w increases (decreases) as o increases. Moreover, the 
larger the difference between w and p,, the larger the change of w due to the 
change of o. Using notation similar to that in the previous paragraph, d9/dcr,w 
= d9/da + (d9/dw).(w-fi)/<r and d£/da,w = d£/dcr + (df/dw).(w-//)/<7, so 
H5) 9 log 9 _ d log 9 w-/£ a log 9 
* ' d log <7,w — d log o w 'd log w 
d log £
 = d log £ w-/i d log £ 
d log (7,W 9 log <X W "9 log W 
Recall that the estimation results implied that the elasticity of 9 w.r.t. 
w is negative and that £'(w)>0. Now, let us look at the signs of the 
elasticities w.r.t. {n,vt). If fJ. increases, then w also increases, giving an 
extra upward push to £. Consequently, the elasticity of £ w.r.t. (A*,W) is 
positive and larger than the elasticity of £ w.r.t. \i if w does not change. On 
the other hand, this additional increase of w and £ causes the elasticity of 9 
w.r.t. (//,w) to be smaller than the corresponding elasticity if w does not 
change. By elaborating on equation (13) one can show that if l-a0>O (which the 
estimation results confirmed), then the elasticity of 9 w.r.t. (At,w) is 
negative. It should be noted that if oc=0 then any increase of fj, would imply an 
equally large change of £ (so ö£/ctyj,w = 1), thus holding F(f) and therefore 9 
unchanged. 
To examine the sign of the elasticity of £ w.r.t. (<7,w) we have to 
distinguish different cases. If £</i then w<^, and an increase of er generates a 
decrease of w. Consequently, £ decreases. If on the other hand w>fi, then an 
increase of o generates an increase of w. Because w> t^ also implies that £>//, 
it follows that £ increases. If w</i<£ then for the general case the sign of 
the elasticity is indeterminate. 
Now let us examine the elasticity of 9 w.r.t. (cr,w). The partial effects 
of the increase of o and the change of w generally work in opposite directions 
on 9. If for instance £<fi, then the partial effect of a is negative (see thé 
previous subsection), while, because w decreases, the partial effect of w is 
positive. By elaborating equation (15) it can be shown that if w<^t, then the 
elasticity is positive. In this case, the negative effect on 9 that was found 
in the previous subsection is dominated by the decrease of w. More generally, 
the elasticity is positive if and only if w</i+c/o;, so for w> t^ no general 
statement can be made. Ho wever, if w is large enough then the elasticity is 
negative. It should be noted that if c=0 then the elasticity is zero. The 
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reason for this is that c=0 implies that £=w, so F(£) does not change. 
Summarizing, one might say that if a change of \i or o is accompanied by a 
change of w, then the effects on £ are more pronounced and the effects on 9 
are less pronounced than the effects that would prevail if w does not change. 
3.3. Estimation of the elasticities 
In this subsection we present an estimation method for the elasticities that 
neither requires strong assumptions on the shape of the wage offer 
distribution, nor requires the estimation of the whole distribution function 
F. As argued before, these are desirable properties for an estimation 
strategy. 
The estimation of the model in Subsection 2.3 provides estimates of the 
parameters of c and 9. By substituting these into equations (4), (5) and (6), 
estimates of c, 9 and £ follow for every individual in the sample. From the 
equations on the elasticities in Subsection 3.2 it therefore follows that we 
only need estimates of /z and ^>(£) to be able to estimate the elasticities. 
This does not imply that we need to estimate the whole distribution function 
F. In particular, though we aim at estimating elasticities w.r.t er, no 
estimate of a is needed if \i and ip(£) can be estimated directly from the data. 
First, consider estimating ip(£). This variable enters the expressions for 
the elasticities because the derivative of 9 w.r.t. £ and the partial 
derivatives (holding f constant) of 9 w.r.t. \i and o depend on it. This 
implies that tp(£) can be estimated by estimating how 9 depends on £ (89/d£ = 
-Af(f) = -9ip{£)). By differentiating 9 w.r.t. w it follows that 89/d£ = 
(89/dw)/(8€/dw). Now note that the empirical model (equations (4), (5) and 
(6)), though being partly specified in reduced-form, explicitly describes how 
f and 9 depend on w. So, from the empirical model, an estimable expression for 
d9/d£ can be derived. As a result, 
(16) *(£) - (1 -Q0) 2 . g 
[
 '
 vyz
' ~ (l+ocp) . ( w . ( l - a ö ) - /?0c) 
Note that this expression does not depend on /z. In Section 4 we will refer to 
the following alternative formulations of (16), 
(17) *(0 = --Q-öfiQ^ =
 ¥fW) 
Substitution of (16) into the equations for the elasticities simplifies 
these equations considerably. For example, equation (12) reduces to 
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d log 9 _ 1-oiB £-fi 
d log o 1+ocp '" * w 
and the elasticity of 9 w.r.t. (<r,w) equals 
d log 9
 = p+B „ a(fi-w)+c 
d log <r,w 1+ap '^ w 
Now let us turn to the estimation of p,. Clearly, F (and therefore /i) is 
different in different segments of the labour market. We define 15 different 
segments by distinguishing between five levels of education (1: no certificate 
after primary education, 2: lower secondary education, 3: secondary education, 
4: higher vocational training, 5: university) and three age categories (23-29, 
30-40, 41-65). We assume that F is identical for every individual within a 
segment, with the qualification that within a segment /z is allowed to be a 
linear function of dummy variables indicating the occupation category (four 
categories are distinguished: academie, administrative/commercial, services, 
and industrial) and whether one is married or not, and of a variable related 
to the number of working individuals in the household. No restrictions across 
different segments are imposed. Note that all variables influencing F must be 
in x2 in equation (6), since F is an explanatory 'variable' for 9. 
If random drawings from F were available, then, under mild conditions, 
estimates for // could be obtained by regressing such drawings on the 
explanatory variables for \i separately for each segment. As mentioned above, 
we do not observe random drawings from F in our data set, nor do we observe 
wages earned after the present spell. However, the present wages could be 
regarded as drawings from F truncated at the value of the reservation wage at 
the previous job or at the spell of unemployment that preceded. Note that we 
do not know anything about the values of these points of truncation, simply 
because the data do not provide income variables for spells that ended before 
the date of the interview. To examine whether this selection effect is 
prominent, we use an ad hoc reduced-form model. We take a latent variable y 
determining whether one is employed: w is observed if and only if y >0. It is 
assumed that y is a linear function of observed exogenous variables and an 
error term. We assume that this error term and the wage offers follow a 
bivariate normal distribution. 
Clearly, this procedure for estimating fi may be flawed for a variety of 
reasons. In particular, it may not be able to correct for selectivity. 
Therefore, in Subsection 4.2, we pay attention to the robustness of the 
results with respect to the estimates of /i, by re-estimating the elasticities 
using different estimates of p,. 
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To facilitate estimation of this latent variable model, data on unemployed 
individuals (y <0) are used in addition to data on employed individuals 
(y >0). For most segments, the estimated covariance of the bivariate normal 
distribution is insignificantly different from zero at the 5% level. This 
means that the events as captured by the latent variable y have no 
significant influence on w. (This is a result which is frequently encountered 
in the literature, see e.g. Van Opstal & Theeuwes (1986), Narendranathan & 
Nickell (1985) and Van den Berg (1990).) Furthermore, for the segments for 
which the covariance is significant, the estimates for /i are almost completely 
identical to the estimates obtained by performing OLS of w on the explanatory 
variables for /z. Therefore the latent equation is dropped and /z is estimated 
by OLS. 
4. Results 
4.1. Estimates of the elasticities 
Table 1 presents the sample averages of the estimates of the elasticities that 
prevail if w does not change, i.e., the elasticities derived in Subsection 
3.1. It may be interesting to examine in what sense the estimates depend on 
the location of the present wage relative to the wage offer distribution. For 
that purpose we construct six wage categories (category 1: w</z-2u>, 2: 
/i-2w<w</x-w, 3: ^ -«<w</x, 4: fi<w</j,+u, 5: /u+w<w<^+2«, 6: /z+2w<w). The numbers w 
are simply estimated by the Standard deviations of the error terms in the 
regressions performed to estimate //. This results in different estimates of w 
for each segment of the labour market. In fact, the boundaries of the wage 
categories will generally differ across individuals. Note that it is not our 
intention to interpret w as an estimate of o. The estimates w are only needed 
for a rough indication of the location of w in F. 
The differences between the sample averages for different age categories 
are minimal, so a subdivision into such categories is not presented. 
The following may help in understanding the magnitude of the elasticity 
estimates. First, recall that the estimate of /? equals 0.41 and the sample 
average of the estimate of £'(w) equals 1.11, with a small Standard deviation 
over the sample. (In particular, the differences between the sample averages 
of £'(w) for the wage location categories are almost zero.) As a result, from 
equation (17), ^(£(w)) is very close to 0.37/w for a wide range of w. Now 
recall that on average w is about 12% smaller than f. Therefore ip{£) can be 
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approximated by 0.42/£ for a wide range of £. The function xp(x) corresponding 
to a Pareto distribution with parameters v and w0 (F(x)=(w0/x)" with i/,w0>0) 
equals u/w. If v<l then E(x) does not exist. It follows therefore that in the 
relevant area in the domain of our F, the spread of the wage offers is quite 
large, or, in other words, the tail of our F is thick. This implies that the 
relative decrease of the proportion of acceptable wage offers (and therefore 
the transition rate 8) due to an increase of the reservation wage f is small. 
In formula, the elasticity of 8 w.r.t. £ equals - f .^ ( f ) , which has a sample 
average of -0.42. Changes of f result in proportionally smaller changes of 8. 
Table 1. Elasticities w.r.t. the mean and Standard deviation 
of the wage offer distribution. 
wage location category 1 2 3 4 5 6 overall 
(i) w.r.t. the mean fx 
a ï ° g ^ (reservation 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
o log \i v 
wage) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
9 lo g ° ( e x i t r a t e ) ° '5 5 °"51 °"42 °*34 ° - 2 8 ° - 2 2 ° - 3 8 
(0.13) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) 
(ii) vi.r.t. the Standard deviation o 
i }°S ^ -o.oi -o.oi o.oo o.oo o.oi o.oi o.oo 
d log o 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
f | ° g e -0.15 -0.09 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.03 
o log o 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) 
category sample size 2 145 901 507 136 66 1757 
in parentheses: Standard deviation of the (estimated) elasticities across the 
sample. 
The second notable fact concerns the insensitivity of £ w.r.t. changes of 
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its determinants. As mentioned before, £ can be thought of as being a sum of 
two parts, one of which is w, which on average equals about 88% of the 
magnitude of £. The elasticity of £ w.r.t. the other term is therefore about 
0.12. Any change in F influences £ through this other term only. Therefore, 
unless this term is extremely sensitive w.r.t changes in fj, or <r, any such 
change does not make the individual much more or much less selective with 
regard to job offers. 
Because the reservation wages are almost completely insensitive w.r.t an 
increase of fx, the effect on 9 of such an increase is virtually equal to the 
effect that would arise if £ were constant. On average, a 10% increase of the 
mean of the wage offer distribution increases the transition rate from the 
present job to other jobs by 3.8%. 
Turning to the more interesting elasticities (those w.r.t. a) we again see 
that, because the reservation wage elasticities are virtually equal to zero, 
the effect on 9 is again virtually equal to the effect that would arise if £ 
were constant. It is not surprising that on average the elasticity of 9 w.r.t 
o is almost equal to zero, since it is positive for individuals with £>n and 
negative for individuals with f</x. If o increases then the shift in the 
distribution is more pronounced at points far away from \i than it is at points 
close to /i. For individuals for whom w</i-2u;, a 10% increase of the Standard 
deviation of the wage offer distribution implies a 1.5% decrease of the 
transition rate from the present job to other jobs. For individuals with 
W>/J+2W, such an increase implies a 2% increase of this transition rate. 
We now turn to the estimates of the elasticities prevailing if w changes 
in accordance with the changes of fj, and er, i.e., the elasticities derived in 
Subsection 3.2. Table 2 presents the sample averages. 
The results in Table 2 are substantially different from those in Table 1. 
Concerning a change of n, the effects on £ (9) are more (less) pronounced as 
in Table 1, as was to be expected. Note that öw=d/i (the infinitesimal changes 
are equal), so the proportional change of w occurring if \i changes, is larger 
for smaller w. As a result, the differences with Table 1 are the largest for 
the lowest wage location categories. The positive effect on 9 of an increase 
of \i found in Table 1, is dominated by the negative effect of the increase of 
w, and in general the resulting elasticity is close to zero. 
Let us turn to the elasticities w.r.t. er in Table 2. There holds that 
dw=((w-fj,)/a)da, so the larger the difference between w and //, the larger the 
change of w occurring when a changes. As a result, the differences with the 
elasticities w.r.t. o in Table 1 are largest for the lowest and highest wage 
location categories. Except for individuals with w close to /i, the effects on 
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£ (6) are more (less) pronounced than in Table 1. For individuals with f</z, 
the negative effect on 9 of an increase in o found in Table 1, is dominated by 
the positive effect of the decrease of w, though the resulting elasticity is 
close to zero. For individuals with W>^J, the positive effect on 8 of an 
increase of o found in Table 1, is almost canceled by the negative effect of 
the increase of w. 
Table 2. Elasticities w.r.t. the mean and Standard deviation 
of the wage offer distribution if the present wage is also affected. 
wage location category 1 2 3 4 5 6 overall 
(i) w.r.t. the mean n 
d l o g ^ 1-54 1.39 1.12 0.92 0.75 0.59 1.04 
d log /x,w 
(0.08) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.21) 
a V ° g ° -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
d log //,w 
-0.05 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
(ii) w.r.t. the Standard deviation o 
ƒ , l o g ^ -0.51 -0.39 -0.13 0.08 0.24 0.41 -0.04 
o log er,w 
(0.22) (0.15) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.20) 
d l o g ° 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 
O l o g CT,W 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
category sample size 2 145 901 507 136 66 1757 
in parentheses: Standard deviation of the (estimated) elasticities across the 
sample. 
Concluding, one might say that if one is interested in an increase of 
mobility, then, for individuals with relatively high wages, an increase of the 
dispersion of the wage offer distribution is more effective than a joint 
increase of this dispersion and a change of the present wage. For individuals 
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with relatively low wages the opposite result holds, though for these 
individuals the increase of mobility under the latter policy is still quite 
small. 
Of course,* policy aims do not necessarily have to be restricted to changes 
of /i or (7 only. For example, an increase of o may be accompanied by an 
increase of pi to offset the shift to the left of the left tail of the wage 
offer distribution. The effects of joint changes of pi and a can be determined 
simply by combining the elasticities w.r.t. pi and o. Similarly, if o (and/or 
pi) depends on a tax parameter r, then the effects of a change of r can be 
determined by using the elasticities w.r.t. o (and/or pi) and the elasticities 
of o (and/or pi) w.r.t. r. 
It should be noted that the results in this paper are based on a micro 
analysis focusing on one side of the labour market. At a macro level increases 
in pi or o are likely to generate additional effects. For example, the strategy 
of the unemployed may change in response to changes of F, causing total 
unemployment to change. Because of this, unemployment insurance premiums may 
change, which may affect the distribution of net wage offers F. Also, an 
increase of o may imply a decrease of the minimum wage. This may be an 
incentive for employers to create new jobs, which in turn may increase the job 
offer arrival rate A. A promising topic for future research would be to 
analyze these issues in an equilibrium search framework (e.g. Burdett k, 
Mortensen (1993)'s) which takes account of policy instruments like the 
structure of the income tax system and the minimum wage. 
4.2. Robustness with respect to the estimates of the mean of F 
The estimates of pi (and therefore of the elasticities) may be biased for a 
number of reasons. One of them is the neglect of the accumulation of human 
capital. If individuals accumulate job-specific human capital then it is 
likely that wages increase as a function of job duration. In that case the 
present wages of individuals at the moment of the interview are not random 
drawings from the truncated wage offer distribution. As a result, pi will be 
over-estimated. It is likely that such an effect will be more pronounced for 
older individuals, since on average these have larger job durations. The most 
extreme scenario would be that the whole difference between the estimates of pi 
for different age categories (but within the same education category) is due 
to accumulation of job-specific human capital. To examine the consequences of 
this possibility, we re-estimated the elasticities, using the estimates of pi 
from the lowest age category within an education category for every age 
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category. Table 3 presents the elasticity estimates. The estimates that are 
virtually equal to those presented in Tables I and 2 are deleted. 
Table 3. Elasticities w.r.t . \i and o corrected for human capital accumulation. 
wage location category 1 2 3 4 5 6 overall 
(i) w.r.t. the mean pt 
a ! ° S ° 0.48 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.23 0.33 
d log n 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) 
d l 0 S * 1.35 1.30 1.11 0.92 0.77 0.60 0.91 
o log fi,w 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.22) 
(ii) w.r.t. the Standard deviation o 
\ }°8 9 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.09 
o log o" 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) 
d l o g ^ -0.33 -0.29 -0.09 0.08 0.21 0.38 0.09 
O lOg <7,W 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.20) 
category sample size 5 91 445 602 289 325 1757 
in parentheses: Standard deviation of the (estimated) elasticities across the 
sample. 
Because, for individuals aged over 29, \i is generally smaller than it was 
before, the number of individuals in low (high) wage location categories has 
decreased (increased) in comparison to the numbers in Tables 1 and 2. However, 
for these individuals w also has become smaller, causing a shift of 
individuals from categories with wages close to n towards peripheral 
categories. 
For individuals aged over 29, the individual estimates of the elasticities 
w.r.t. n and (^,w) are all smaller (closer to zero) than in the previous 
subsection. However, the main conclusions about the sample averages of these 
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estimates remain valid. The individual estimates of the elasticities w.r.t. o 
with w constant are larger than before, in the sense that positive estimates 
become larger and negative elasticities tend to zero (and may become 
positive). The average effect of an increase of o on mobility is therefore a 
bit more positive than was found in the previous subsection. 
We also observe that for individuals over 29 the individual estimates of 
the elasticity of £ w.r.t. (<r,w) are somewhat larger than before ('larger' in 
the same sense as in the previous paragraph). Most individual estimates of the 
elasticity of 6 w.r.t. (cr,w) are almost the same as before and therefore close 
to zero. 
As a conclusion, it seems that the results are robust w.r.t. biases in /i 
originating from a neglect of job-specific human capital accumulation. 
Another reason for the estimates of \i to be biased is because the limited 
dependent variable model used to estimate \i may not capture all selection 
effects. The unaccounted selection effects may be such that n is 
over-estimated. To examine whether the results are robust w.r.t. such 
misspecifications, we re-estimated the elasticities assuming that y, equals 0.8 
times the original estimate of fi. Not surprisingly, the results very much 
resemble those reported in Table 3. In fact, they deviate a bit more from 
those in Tables 1 and 2 than the results in Table 3 do. Recall that now the 
elasticities also change for individuals under 30. Nevertheless, the 
robustness of the results w.r.t. the magnitude of fi is reinforced. 
The value of ip(£) is an important determinant of the elasticity estimates, 
since it reflects to what extent changes of f, and changes of \i and <r, holding 
£ constant, are translated into changes of 6 (e.g. recall that d9/d£ = -0.^(£) 
and that the partial derivative of 6 w.r.t. //, holding £ constant, equals 
6.rp(€)). We estimate f(£) using an expression for it that follows from the 
empirical model. This expression crucially depends on the specifications of 
the derivatives of 6 and £ as functions of w (see equations (17), (4), (5) and 
(6)). To examine whether the elasticity estimates are sensitive with respect 
to these specifications, the model is re-estimated using more flexible 
functional forms for ö(w) and c(w). Specifically, the variables (log w) and 
w2 are included as additional regressors in x2 and x1? respectively (see 
equations (5) and (6)). 
Adding w2 in xx has almost no effect on the estimation results, whether 
(log w)2 is included in x2 or not. In both cases c(w) is virtually linear on 
the wage interval of interest. If (log w) is included in ö(w) then the 
estimates of the coefficients in ö(w) associated with log w and (log w) are 
-17.79 (t=3.0) and 1.112 (t=3.0), respectively. This means that ö(w) attains a 
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minimum at w=2970, so for individuals who have w>2970 (12% of the sample) the 
estimated 0(w) is increasing in w. However, if attention is restricted to the 
subsample for which w>2970, then it appears that ö(w) is not increasing on 
w>2970. The fact that (log w) has a significantly positive influence on 9 may 
therefore be due to the nonlinearity of log 0(w) in log w for small w. The 
estimates and Standard errors of the other parameters in 0(w) and c(w) and the 
main characteristics of the search process (c, 9, £) are almost identical to 
those reported in Van den Berg (1992). 
Because of the inclusion of the (log w) term in 0(w), the sample average 
of the elasticity of 9 with respect to w changes from -0.41 to -0.73. Since 
the elasticity of £ with respect to w does not change much, this implies that 
on average 9 is now a bit more sensitive with respect to £. However, for 
individuals who have w>2970 the estimate of ö'(w) is positive, so the 
elasticity estimates are senseless if w>2970. Following the argument above, 
this is regarded as a consequence of the rigidity of the quadratic 
specification of log 0(w) as a function of log w. For individuals with w<2970 
the sample averages of the elasticity estimates do not differ substantially 
from those in Tables 1 and 2. The main difference is that here the elasticity 
of 9 w.r.t. ir is a bit smaller (more negative) for the lowest wage location 
categories. In sum, the main conclusions from Subsection 4.1 seern to be robust 
with respect to the specifications of 9 and c as functions of w. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the influence of wage dispersion on job 
mobility. We used an on-the-job search model to describe the strategy of 
working individuals. This model pays attention to the costs associated with 
moving from one job to another job, because such transaction costs are likely 
to be among the important factors determining job mobility. For this model, we 
derived elasticities of the transition rate from the present job to other jobs 
(and of the present reservation wage) with respect to moments of the wage 
offer distribution. We developed and used an estimation method for these 
elasticities that does not require the assumption of a specific parametric 
form of this distribution, nor estimation of the whole distribution. It 
appears that the reservation wages are almost completely insensitive w.r.t. 
changes of the Standard deviation of the wage offer distribution. The 
elasticity of the transition rate from the present job to other jobs w.r.t 
this Standard deviation is positive for individuals with relatively high 
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wages, while it is negative for individuals with relatively low wages. Still, 
the estimated elasticity values do not differ much from zero (they range from 
about -0.15 to 0.2). 
It can be argued that policies aimed at changing the wage offer 
distribution also affect present wages of working individuals. Therefore we 
also examined what happens to mobility if., in addition to a change of the wage 
offer distribution, present wages change in a way corresponding to their place 
in that distribution. Generally, the effects on the transition rate to other 
jobs are less pronounced than in the case in which the present wage is 
constant. 
All results are robust w.r.t. the estimated values of the mean of the wage 
offer distribution. Also, from the results it follows that for our purposes it 
does not matter much whether the model takes account of the costs of moving to 
another job. A model in which the reservation wage is assumed to be equal to 
the present wage would yield similar elasticity estimates. 
It would be interesting to replicate the analysis using longitudinal data 
from a time period in which a change of the dispersion of wage offers actually 
occurs. However, if such a change is anticipated, then the model becomes 
nonstationary and, therefore, extremely complicated to handle. In practice it 
may be hard to distinguish between the effects of anticipation and other 
determinants of behaviour. Therefore, the survey should preferably follow 
individuals for a large number of years. 
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Appendix 
The elasticity of the Gini coëfficiënt with respect to the Standard 
deviation 
Let wage offers x have a distribution function F satisfying the assumptions in 
Subsection 3.1. We denote the standardized version of x by y, so x=/x+<r.y. 
Qearly, the p.d.f. of y equals f0. Let ax and ay denote the lower bounds of 
the intervals of support of x and y, respectively. It follows that 
(Al) ax = \i + <T.ay 
Because E(y)=0 and V(y)=l, there holds that ay<0. We assume that ax>0. (This 
is a weak assumption. Note that the Gini coëfficiënt is undefined for random 
variables that are negative with a positive probability.) Because f0 does not 
depend on fj, or er, ay does not either. Consequently, if er changes then ax will 
also change. 
From Kakwani (1980), the Gini coëfficiënt G of the distribution of x is 
defined as 
.. 00 00 
G =
 k • ƒ i* ix"z| - f(x)- f(z)dx dz 
ax ax 
This equation can be rewritten along the lines of Kakwani (1980), 
9 00 
(A2) G = l-± .ƒ x.F(x).f(x) dx 
ax 
If we substitute equations (7), (8) and (Al) into (A2), and elaborate, we get 
00 -i 
-2. f y.F0(y).f0(y) dy 
Note that the term in square brackets in (A3) is positive. (In fact, it can be 
shown to equal v,2.E(|y1-y2|), with yx and y2 being independent random variables 
having the same distribution as y (i.e., having p.d.f. f0).) 
The term in square brackets in (A3) does not depend on a. Consequently, 
dG/dcr = G/a, and the result follows. 
(A3) G = - . 
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